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The established view on oligopolistic competition with environmental exter-
nalities has it that, since ﬁrms neglect the external eﬀect, their incentive to
invest in R&D for pollution abatement is nil unless they are subject to some
form of environmental taxation. We take a dynamic approach to this issue,
using a simple diﬀerential game to show that the conclusion reached by the
static literature is not robust, as the introduction of dynamics shows that
ﬁrms do invest in R&D for environmental-friendly technologies throughout
the game, as long as R&D is accompanied by an output restriction exhibiting
a distinctively collusive ﬂavour. We also examine the social planning case
and the eﬀects of Pigouvian taxation, to show that there exists a feasible
tax rate inducing proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms to choose a combination of output and
R&D such that the resulting social welfare level is the same as in the ﬁrst
best.
Keywords: pollution, environmental externality, R&D, diﬀerential games,
social planning
JEL Codes: H23, L13, O31, Q551I n t r o d u c t i o n
The enormous amount of data being assembled by the IPCC (Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change) on the anthropic responsibility in gen-
erating (or at least increasing) global warming, and the debate on how to
cope with it along the guidelines of the Kyoto Protocol and its follow-ups,
are clearly identifying the control of polluting emissions damaging the envi-
ronment as one of the hottest scientiﬁc issues of our times. As such, it is
receiving an increasing amount of attention in the current literature in the
ﬁeld of environmental economics, with particular attention to the general
equilibrium implications of environmental aspects on trade and growth.1
Most of the existing contributions adopting a partial equilibrium approach
investigate the design of optimal Pigouvian taxation aimed at inducing ﬁrms
to reduce damaging emissions, both in monopoly and oligopoly settings.2
A related stream of literature examines the incentive for ﬁrms to carry out
R&D activities in order to introduce environmental-friendly technologies. In
static games, this requires the introduction of some form of taxation/subsidy
by the policy maker, in order to induce ﬁrms to take into account the pres-
ence of the externality, that they would clearly neglect otherwise.3 At h i r d
line of research investigates the optimal design of minimum quality stan-
dards and/or proﬁtt a x a t i o ni nv e r t i c a l l yd i ﬀerentiated industries aﬀected
by environmental externalities.4
1On the optimality of free trade with environmental externalities, see Copeland and
Taylor (1994, 2004) and Antweiler et al. (2001). As to the role of environmental issues in
growth theory, see Grossman and Krueger (1995), Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997), Bartz
and Kelly (2008) and Itaya (2008), inter alia.
2See Karp and Livernois (1994) and Benchekroun and Long (1998, 2002), inter alia.
3To this regard, see Downing and White (1986), Milliman and Prince (1989), Damania
(1996), Scott (1996), Chiou and Hu (2001), Mohr (2002), Hart (2004), Greaker (2006) and
Poyago-Theotoky (2007), inter alia.
4See Lutz et al. (2000), Amacher et al. (2004), Lombardini-Riipinen (2005), Andr´ e et
1In the present paper, we take a diﬀerential game approach to the in-
vestigation of environmentally-oriented R&D eﬀorts in a dynamic Cournot
oligopoly model where (at least in the ﬁrst version of the game) there may
not be any tax or subsidy linked to the external eﬀect, in order to show that
the main message emerging from the corresponding static version of the same
game falls short of telling the whole story of the issue at hand. In particular,
we describe a scenario where the stock of pollution increases in proportion
to industry output, and each ﬁrm may invest in R&D in order to diminish
its individual contribution to the emission of pollutants.
Our ﬁrst result consists in showing that unregulated ﬁrms may indeed
fully neglect the environmental eﬀects of their productive activity and repli-
cate the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium forever, without putting any eﬀort
whatsoever in R&D activities for cleaner technologies at any point in time.
However, we also show that the alternative may in fact be more attractive,
if R&D eﬀorts go along with an output contraction closely resembling car-
tel behaviour, although the setup remains fully non cooperative. That is,
we identify a path along which, by taking explicitly into account the exter-
nality, ﬁrms performs environmental R&D investments not because of some
altruistic or environmental concern but for pure proﬁt-seeking reasons.
T h eg a m ea m o n gu n r e g u l a t e dﬁrms yields multiple steady state equilibria,
all of them (except of course the quasi-static solution replicating the Cournot
outcome forever) being characterised by positive R&D eﬀorts at all times,
except possibly doomsday. In summary, the appraisal of our analysis of
private incentives can be outlined as follows. First, the static game captures
the main feature of one of the steady states we identify, but cannot grasp the
essence of what happens along the optimal path to this long run equilibrium.
Secondly, the remaining two equilibria, both emerging whenever the stock
of polluting emissions vanishes, are linked by saddle point trajectories which
al. (2009) and Bottega and De Freitas (2009), inter alia.
2exit the least preferable point to enter the most desirable one, as far as
proﬁt, consumer surplus and social welfare are concerned. This is a desirable
property, entirely driven by proﬁt incentives, which in the present case are
not in conﬂict with social preferences.
Then, we examine two modiﬁed versions of our setup: in the ﬁrst one,
a social planner concentrates the production of the good in a unique plant,
whereby the activity of R&D takes place in N diﬀerent structures (due to the
decreasing returns to scale characterising the R&D technology). In this case,
ﬁve steady state points exist, one of which replicates the perfectly competitive
allocation that would emerge under social planning in the corresponding
static version of the model. Yet, a relevant feature of this equilibrium is that
the planner would be able to reach it only in the very speciﬁc (and totally
unrealistic) case where the production of the ﬁnal good were not polluting
the environment at all.
The second extension takes into account the possibility of regulating
proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms via the introduction of a Pigouvian tax associated to
the environmental externality. In this case, we show that the tax can be
designed so as to induce the industry to yield the ﬁr s tb e s tl e v e lo fs o c i a l
welfare that is unattainable under planning, although of course the associ-
ated surplus distribution is not the same as it would be at the ﬁrst best.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy
o u t l i n e st h es t a t i cv e r s i o no ft h eg a m e .T h es e t u po ft h ed y n a m i cp r o b l e m
and the related trajectory analysis are laid out in section 3, where we also
compare the proﬁt and welfare performance of the industry in correspondence
of the multiple steady state equilibria. In section 4 we examine the behaviour
of the model under social planning. In section 5 we illustrate the eﬀects of
P i g o u v i a nt a x a t i o no nt h ee q u i l i b r i u mb e h a v i o u ro fp r o ﬁt-seeking ﬁrms as
well as the related welfare levels. Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
32 A summary of the static problem
As a preliminary step, we revisit the static Cournot game in order to high-
light the lack of R&D incentives to decrease the amount of polluting emis-
sions characterising ﬁrms. The market is supplied by N single-product
homogeneous-good ﬁr m s .T h em a r k e td e m a n df u n c t i o ni sp = a − Q, with
Q =
PN
i=1 qi,q i being ﬁrm i’s output. Technology is the same for all ﬁrms
alike, and it is summarised by the cost function C = cqi. Supplying the ﬁ-
nal good entails a negative environmental externality S =
PN
i=1 biqi, where
bi = b − ki ≥ 0; b measures the marginal contribution of each ﬁrm to the
stock of pollutants; ki is the R&D eﬀort of ﬁrm i to decrease its individual
amount of pollution,5 and it involves a convex cost Γi = rk2
i,r>0. Con-
sequently, ﬁrm i’s instantaneous proﬁts are πi =( p − c)qi − Γi. This game
has a two-stage structure: in the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms non-cooperatively and si-
multaneously set their respective R&D eﬀorts; in the second, they compete
` al aCournot-Nash. The solution concept is subgame perfection by backward
induction.
The optimal individual output in the second stage is q∗ =( a − c)/(N +1 ),
whereby the proﬁtf u n c t i o na tt h eﬁrst stage reads as πi =( q∗)2 − rk2
i. This
clearly entails that ∂πi/∂ki < 0, and therefore the optimal R&D investment
is nil, yielding the static Cournot-Nash proﬁts πCN =( q∗)2.O n t h i s b a -
sis, one has to introduce some form of environmental taxation, no matter
w h e t h e ri ti sﬁrm-speciﬁc or not, to induce ﬁrms to take into account the
presence of the externality and indeed carry out some R&D eﬀorts to reduce
it. As we shall see in the following sections, this is not necessarily the case if
one adopts a properly dynamic approach to this issue.
5Here we assume ﬁrm-speciﬁc externalities and R&D activities, as it appears to be
reasonable in examining investments in environmental-friendly technologies. Hence, we
rule out the possibility of spillovers in R&D.
43 The dynamic setup
As in the static model, consider a Cournot oligopoly with N single-product
homogeneous-good ﬁrms interacting over continuous time t ∈ [0,∞). At any
time t, the demand function is p(t)=a−Q(t), with Q(t)=
PN
i=1 qi (t),q i (t)
being the instantaneous individual output of ﬁrm i.A l lﬁrms use the same
productive technology, described by the cost function C (t)=cqi (t). The
production of the ﬁnal output involves a negative environmental externality





bi (t)qi (t) − δS(t), (1)
where δ>0 is a constant decay rate and S (0) = S0 > 0 is the initial
condition. The coeﬃcient bi (t) ≥ 0, with bi (0) = bi0 ≥ 0, measures the
marginal contribution to the stock of pollution that the production of ﬁrm
i entails. Depending on the R&D eﬀort ki (t)o fi,, it evolves over time
a c c o r d i n gt ot h ef o l l o w i n ge q u a t i o n :
·
bi (t)=bi (t)[η − ki (t)],η>0. (2)
That is, until ki is smaller than the threshold value η, bi is increasing. As
in the static game, the instantaneous cost associated with the R&D activity
is Γi (t)=rk2
i (t), with r>0. Hence, ﬁrm i’s instantaneous proﬁts are





{[p(t) − c]qi (t) − Γi (t)}e
−ρtdt, (3)
under the state equations (1) and (2) and the initial conditions. Parameter
ρ>0 is a constant discount rate common to all ﬁrms.
53.1 Equilibrium analysis of the game
The solution concept is the open-loop Nash equilibrium. The current-value
Hamiltonian of ﬁrm i is:
Hi (·)=
(












with the following necessary conditions (FOCs):
∂Hi
∂qi
= σ − 2qi (t) − Q−i (t)+λi (t)bi (t)=0 ( 5 )
where Q−i (t) ≡
P
j6=i qj (t)a n dσ ≡ a − c;
∂Hi
∂ki
= −2rki (t) − µii (t)bi (t)=0 , (6)
Notice that µij (t) does not appear in the FOCs. The adjoint equations read
as follows:
·
λi (t)=( ρ + δ)λi (t)( 7 )
·
µii (t)=[ ρ − η + ki (t)]µii (t) − λi (t)qi (t)( 8 )
·
µij (t)=[ ρ − η + kj (t)]µij (t) − λi (t)qj (t). (9)
From (5) and (6) one obtains, respectively:
λi (t)=−







The associated transversality conditions are:
lim
t→∞e
−ρtλi (t)S (t)=0 ;
lim
t→∞e
−ρtµii (t)bi (t)=0 ; ( 1 2 )
lim
t→∞e
−ρtµij (t)bj (t)=0 .
6Before carrying out the equilibrium analysis, it is worth dwelling upon
the interpretation of the above necessary conditions. First of all, note that
(7) admits the solution λi (t)=0a ta l lt i m e s ,w h i c hi nt u r na l l o w sµii (t)=0
t ob eas o l u t i o nt o( 8 ) .I ns u c hac a s e ,t he dynamic model would immediately
reproduce the very same outcome of the static game, with no investments at
all at any time and the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium replicated at all t:
Proposition 1 Adjoint equations admit the solution λi (t)=µii (t)=0
at all t ∈ [0,∞). This entails qi (t)=σ/(N +1 ) and ki (t)=0for all
i =1 ,2,3,...N at all t ∈ [0,∞).
However, if the R&D control is always nil and the output control is al-
ways equal to the static Cournot-Nash solution, the level of pollution would
explode to plus inﬁnity unless bi (0) = bi0 =0 , i.e., unless the polluting fea-
tures of productive technology are not an issue because technology itself is
already clean at the very outset (which of course makes the entire story a
trivial one). From a technical standpoint, this is equivalent to saying that
transversality condition would be violated.
Additionally, adjoint equations (7-8) also admits non-nil solutions which,
by deﬁnition, do not appear in the static version of the game. This has some
interesting implications as to the ﬁrms’ incentive to invest in environmental-
friendly technologies. To shed light on this aspect, we may propose the
following observations.
Equation (5) produces ﬁrm i’s instantaneous best reply:
q
∗ (Q−i (t)) =
σ − Q−i (t)+λi (t)bi (t)
2
(13)
which shifts inwards (resp. outwards) w.r.t. its static counterpart for all
λi (t) < 0 (resp., λi (t) > 0). Equivalently, (10) takes a negative value for
all Q(t) <Nσ /(N +1 ), i.e., whenever the industry output is lower than its
static Cournot-Nash level (and conversely). Now, if λi (t) < 0, the inward
7shift of best reply functions entails a quasi-collusive behaviour on the part of
ﬁrms, via an output contraction that, nonetheless, is driven by a fully non
cooperative behaviour. Also, note that (8) yields µii (t) < 0 for all ki (t) > 0.
The fact that adjoint variables are negative indicates that ﬁrm i attaches
a negative shadow value to its marginal contribution to the increase in the
pollution stock. Yet, the output contraction opens the possibility that the
ﬁrm increases its proﬁts instant by instant, even if a costly R&D project
for a greener technology is undertaken.6 That is, the incentive to adopt the
investment strategy associated with λi (t) < 0 is highlighted by the ﬂow of
instantaneous gains exempliﬁed by:
π
CN (k =0 )≡
σ2
(N +1 )
2 < (b p − c) b q − rk
2 ≡ b π(k>0) (14)






. During the game,
ﬁrm i may smooth the R&D investment not because she has developed any
environmentally-oriented conscience of her own, but rather in order to be able
to keep the output at a quasi-collusive level forever. In other words, from
the ﬁrms’ viewpoint, the R&D cost Γi (t)i st h ef e et ob ep a i dt ob u i l du p
a path replicating that of a cartel in quantities, without actually taking any
implicitly collusive attitude that would constitute a target for the antitrust
authority. Conversely, from consumers’ viewpoint, a higher market price is
what they have to pay in return for a cleaner environment.
Having said that, we may proceed to the characterisation of the equilib-
rium behaviour. One can impose symmetry across quantities, costate vari-
ables and states:
qi (t)=qj (t)=q(t),λ i (t)=λj (t)=λ(t), (15)
6U s i n gar e p e a t e dg a m ew i t hi n ﬁnite Nash reversion, Damania (1996) ﬁnds that ﬁrms
may not be willing to buy pollution-abating technologies if the associated exogenous cost
is too high.
8µii (t)=µjj (t)=µ(t),b i (t)=bj (t)=b(t)( 1 6 )
and drop the time argument for brevity. From the FOCs (5) and (6) one also



















which can be rewritten, using (7-8) and (10-11), leading to the following
state-control dynamical system:
·
S (t)=Nb(t)q(t) − δS(t)( 1 8 )
·
b(t)=b(t)(η − k(t)) (19)
·
q(t)=





q(t)[σ − (N +1 )q(t)]
2r
(21)
Although the equations (18-19) and (20-21) are not decoupled, we can stress
that, given any solution curve (q(t), k(t)) of equations (20-21), we can obtain
the state trajectories by applying the methods of separation of variables and




















Which implies that both bi (t)a n dS (t) > 0 are non negative at all times
(except, possibly, doomsday in which they are nil) Before inspecting the
stationary points of the above dynamic system, it is worth observing that,






2r[(N +1 )q(t) − σ][ρ + δ + η − k(t)]





indicating the slope of the open-loop Nash trajectory in the control plane.
The sign of (24) is evaluated in











ρ + δ + η,






ρ + δ + η,




That is to say, for any individual output level lower than the Cournot-
Nash output, there exists an admissible range of values for k(t) wherein the
two controls are substitutes at a generic point in time, during the game. In
such a case, any output contraction with respect to the Cournot-Nash static
equilibrium drives some R&D eﬀort for cleaner technologies.
Steady state equilibria are described by the following:
Proposition 3 The stationary points of the system are:








PB =( SB,b B,q B,k B)=( 0 ,0,q B,δ + ρ + η),











σ2 − 8r(N +1 )( ρ + δ + η)ρ
2(N +1 )
.
Proof. Imposing the stationarity condition
·
k =0y i e l d s
k(q)=
q[σ − (N +1 )q]
2rρ
(25)
which can be plugged into
·







σ2 − 8r(N +1 )( ρ + δ + η)ρ
2(N +1 )
(26)
10with qB,C ∈ R+ for σ>
p
8r(N +1 )( ρ + δ + η)ρ. By substituting in (25)
we have that kB,C = δ + ρ + η.
In correspondence of the Cournot-Nash optimal quantity qA,w eh a v e
kA =0 ., SA =0 ,bA =0 .
The following results show the dynamic behaviour of the optimal solu-
tions:
Proposition 4 PA, PB and PC are saddle points of the system.
Proof. The Jacobian matrix of the state-control system reads as:
J =
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
−δN q N b 0
0 η − k 0 −b






[2(N +1 ) q − σ] ρ
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
. (27)
J(PA) has the eigenvalues λ1 = −δ<0, λ2 = η>0, λ3 = ρ + δ + η>0a n d
λ4 = ρ>0, subsequently PA is a saddle point.
The analysis of the remaining two equilibria is slightly more diﬃcult:
both J(PB)a n dJ(PC) admit the negative eigenvalues λ1 = −δ<0a n d
λ2 = −ρ − δ<0, so the stability properties of those two points depend on
























[2(N +1 ) qj − σ]. (29)
If j = B, the two remaining eigenvalues are complex with real part ρ/2 > 0,
whereas if j = C, they are real and at least one of them is positive, hence
PB and PC are saddle points too.
11As is well known, a saddle point can be reached starting from initial states
that can be subject to more or less stringent conditions. In particular:
Remark 5 The steady state PA is degenerate, as it can be reached only along
an equilibrium trajectory which solves (18-19) for b0 =0and for any S0 > 0,
i.e., it is completely contained in the half-line determined by the intersection
of the hyperspaces b =0 , q =
σ
N +1
, k =0 , with the stock of pollution
asymptotically decreasing to 0.
That is, the equilibrium reproducing the Cournot-Nash outcome can be
attained iﬀ the technology is already fully environmental-friendly from the
outset, which makes this case quite peculiar and somewhat uninteresting.
Or, put it in other terms, the requirement on b0 indicates that the prediction
of the static game is far from convincing. Completely diﬀerent considerations
apply to the remaining two steady states, that are attainable for b0 > 0.
Proposition 6 In the half-space k>η , along each equilibrium trajectory of
the system close to PB and PC the state variables S and b are monotonically
decreasing to 0.
Proof. The stationary points PB and PC belong to the half-space k>η .T h e
eigenvectors of J(PB)a n dJ(PC) imply that the stable subspaces Es(PB)a n d
Es(PC) are spanned by the vectors of the canonical basis of R4:( 1 ,0,0,0)
and (0,1,0,0), that is the trajectories on the respective stable manifolds are
heading towards the equilibrium coordinates S =0 ,b =0 .
The economic meaning of the previous results is clear: in correspondence
of the two points PB and PC the stock of pollution tends to diminish and
ﬁnally disappears.
From the standpoint of the dynamical behaviour of the system, in the
above-mentioned half-space the Nash trajectories approach PB in the control
plane, spiral around it and then head towards PC, which is a saddle point
12in the sense that there exists a phase curve contained in the control plane
which enters PC.A sw ew i l ls e ei nn e x ts u b s e c t i o n ,t h i si sg o o dn e w sb e c a u s e
in that point higher levels of proﬁt and social welfare can be reached with
respect to PB.
The ﬁgures we are going to show in the following are sketched with the
help of Mathematic@ 5.0, after ﬁxing suitably the relevant parameters:





The ﬁrst parametric plot represents a phase curve in a hyperspace S = S0,
being the horizontal plane the control space and the state b the variable on
the vertical axis. Choosing q(0) = 10−2, k(0) = 2 · 10−1, b(0) = 2 as initial
conditions for this numerical simulation, we obtain the following sketch of a
trajectory:
Figure 1. The path spirals down towards the steady state PB in the
control plane as the polluting emissions decrease over time
In the following plot we can visualize the sketches of some equilibrium
trajectories on the (k,q) control plane, with the same parameter values as
13in Figure 1. On such a plane, coherently with the eigenvalues of (28), PB =
(0.16,0.08) is clearly an unstable focus, whereas PC =( 0 .16,0.38) is a saddle
point.
Figure 2. On the control plane, the saddle point trajectories either leave
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium PA or spiral around PB. The feasibility of PC
is ensured
Moreover, the optimal R&D eﬀort of the representative ﬁrm is positive
at any time t during the game. Or, put it the other way around, any non-
zero value of the co-state variable attached to the dynamics of the individual
ﬁrm’s contribution to the increase of the pollution stock ensures that the
ﬁrm itself has indeed an incentive to invest in R&D activities for pollution
abatement all along the game.
3.2 Proﬁt and welfare assessment
In this section we compare the optimal quantities, the level of proﬁts and of
social welfare associated to the three steady states.
14Proposition 7 For every admissible σ, N, r, ρ, δ, η, we have qA >q C >q B.
In steady state, the proﬁt levels are the following:
π(PA)=
σ2
(N +1 ) 2, (30)
π(PB)=σqB − Nq
2




C − r(ρ + δ + η)
2. (32)
On the basis of (30-32), we can state:
Proposition 8 The proﬁts π(PB) and π(PC) are positive if either of the
following holds:
1. ρ ≥ δ + η;
2. ρ<δ+ η and
2
p
2(N +1 ) ( δ + η − ρ) <σ<[(N+1)(δ+η)+(1−N)ρ]
r
r(δ + η + ρ)
δ + η − ρ
.
Assuming that the parameters are such that proﬁts are indeed non nega-
tive, we can make a comparison to assess the relative desirability of the three
outcomes:
Proposition 9 The following inequalities hold:
1. π(PC) >π (PB) irrespective of parameter values;
2. π(PA) >π (PC) if ρ ∈ [0,δ+ η).
The intuition behind the above result is that PA is characterised by a
larger output level (which, per se, would be detrimental for proﬁts) but the
corresponding R&D eﬀort is nil (which in turn is good news for proﬁts), while
the remaining two steady states are characterised by lower output levels
15in combination with positive R&D eﬀorts. In particular, it is noteworthy
observing that the Cournot-Nash solution may be worse than the steady state
PC where the ﬁrm indeed invests in R&D, despite the fact that pollution does
not aﬀect its proﬁts.
Now we turn to consumer surplus CS(Pi),i= A,B,C, in the three
equilibria. Note that, in principle, the deﬁnition of consumer surplus would
be CS(Pi)=Q2
i/2−S; however, S = 0 always in steady state. The resulting
ranking is summarised in
Proposition 10 Over the entire admissible range of parameters, we have
CS(PA) >C S (PC) >C S (PB).
Finally, we evaluate social welfare SW(Pi)=Nπ(Pi)+CS(Pi),i=
A,B,C, to obtain:
Proposition 11 Over the entire admissible range of parameters, we have
SW(PA) >S W(PC) >S W(PB).
Propositions 7-11 also entail:
Corollary 12 Any ρ ∈ [0,δ+ η) suﬃces to ensure that private and so-
cial preferences over the spectrum of steady state equilibria are reciprocally
aligned.
This essentially relies upon the fact that the industry R&D eﬀort in PA is
nil. Note however that, as we have outlined above, PA is indeed degenerate.
4 Social planning
We assume that the benevolent planner uses a single plant for the production
of the consumption good (in view of the constant returns to scale character-
ising the related technology), while keeping N R&D labs, as this activity
16features decreasing returns. Hence, the list of variables reduces to N +1




(σ − q)q +
q2
2
− S − Nrk
2 + λ(bq − δS)+µb(η − k)
¾
(33)
where subscript SP stands for social planning. The necessary conditions are:
∂HSP
∂q
= σ − q + λb =0 ; ( 3 4 )
∂HSP
∂k






λ − ρλ ⇔
·






µ − ρµ ⇔
·
µ =( ρ − η + Nk)µ − λq. (37)
With respect to the case of competition, observe that, under social planning,
in steady state it cannot be that λ = µ = 0. By manipulating the above
conditions, we obtain the following state-control system:
·
S = bq − δS (38)
·
b = b(η − Nk)( 3 9 )
·
q = b +( q − σ)(ρ + δ + η − Nk)( 4 0 )
·




Unlike the oligopoly game we have investigated above, the planner’s problem
yields ﬁve steady state points:
7We attribute to the planner the same time discounting that we have used to measure
ﬁrms’s time preferences in the previous section. One might, however, suppose that the
planner’s discount rate be signiﬁcantly lower than ﬁrms (possibly even nil), in order to
give an appropriate weight to the welfare of future generations. For a thorough appraisal
of this issue, see the Stern Review (Stern, 2007) as well as Dasgupta (2007), Norhaus
(2007) and Weitzman (2007).
17Proposition 13 The stationary points of the system are:
PSP1 =( SSP1,b SP1,q SP1,k SP1)=( 0 ,0,σ,0),
PSP2 =( SSP2,b SP2,q SP2,k SP2)=
µ
0,0,q SP2,




PSP3 =( SSP3,b SP3,q SP3,k SP3)=
µ
0,0,q SP3,






































































which can be plugged into
·
q = 0 to obtain the following solutions:









with qSP2,3 ∈ R+ for σ>
p
8r(ρ + δ + η)ρ/N. This in turns implies kSP2,3 =
(δ + ρ + η)/N. The corresponding state coordinates are S =0 ,b =0 . O n
the other hand, if b 6=0 ,
·
b =0i nk = η/N and plugging this expression into
18·
k =0 , we obtain qSP4,5. Consequently,
·


























































Figure 3 locates the ﬁve steady state points emerging under social plan-
ning in three dimensions, in the space (k,q,S). Note that the equilibrium
points PSP4 and PSP5 entail a positive amount of pollution and therefore do
not belong to the control plane. The existence of the fourth and ﬁfth solu-
tions depends on the fact that the dynamics of the output level (40) depends
19on b, denoting that the planner indeed takes into account the environmental
impact of the production technology when choosing the output level..
The Jacobian matrix is:
J =
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
−δq b 0
0 η − Nk 0 −Nb




(2q − σ) ρ
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
. (44)
By repeating a procedure analogous to the one carried out to produce Propo-
sition 4, we can prove that:
Proposition 14 PSP1, PSP2, PSP3, PSP4 and PSP5 are saddle points.













Proposition 15 1. If ρ ∈ (δ + η,∞), then the proﬁts π(PSP2), π(PSP3),
π(PSP4) and π(PSP5) are positive;
2. if ρ ∈ (δ + η,δ +2 η),t h e nπ(PSP2)=π(PSP3) <π (PSP4)=π(PSP5).
































































rη[2ρ2 + δ(η + ρ)]
δN
.
Proposition 16 1. SW1 >S W 5 >S W 4 and SW3 >S W 2 over the whole
admissible range of parameters;
2. if ρ ∈ (δ + η,δ +2 η) and δ>2η,t h e nSW5 >S W 3.
The steady state replicating the perfectly competitive outcome of the
static model would look like the most desirable one, since the related level
of social welfare exceeds all the remaining ones. However, it remains out of
reach for all b0 > 0.8
Additionally, there exists a subset of the admissible range of parameters
in which the steady state PSP5 is both privately and socially preferable to
all the steady state allocations arising from the open-loop Nash game among
unregulated ﬁrms. With this in mind, we turn now our attention to the
design of a Pigouvian tax/subsidy that may adjust ﬁrms’ incentives so as to
drive them to reproduce PSP1.
8That is, the equivalent of Remark 5 holds here. The proof of this fact follows the same
lines as for the Cournot equilibrium of the open-loop game among ﬁrms. The details have
been omitted for brevity.
215E ﬀects of a Pigouvian taxation
In this section, a Pigouvian tax rate θ>0 is introduced, with taxation taking
the form of a linear function of the environmental externality produced by the
industry. Such a taxation aﬀects each current-value Hamiltonian function,




















As in Benchekroun and Long (1998, 2002), our objective here is to investigate
whether this Pigouvian tax rate can be designed so as to reproduce the same
social welfare level characterising the ﬁrst best (that the planner himself
would be, in general, unable to attain). Clearly, this assumption leaves the
FOCs (5) and (6) unchanged, whereby the adjoint equations (7) become as
follows:
·
λi (t)=( ρ + δ)λi (t)+θ. (49)
The above dynamics implies that the presence of a Pigouvian taxation in-
duces ﬁrms to shrink output levels as compared to the unregulated setting,
as can be ascertained from (13), whenever λi (0) < 0. That is, the policy
maker, being aware of the tradeoﬀ between the price eﬀect and the external
eﬀect implied by any change in output, is willing to accept an increase in
price (as a result of the related higher degree of quasi-collusion) for the sake
of reducing the environmental externality.
Unlike (7), (49) does not admit the nil solution, so Proposition 1 cannot
hold, as in the social planning case. The state-control system is as follows
22(again, omitting the time argument):
·
S = Nbq− δS (50)
·
b = b(η − k)( 5 1 )
·
q =




k = ρk −
q[σ − (N +1 )q]
2r
(53)
As a consequence of taxation, ﬁrms’ cost structure is modiﬁed to account for
pollution, and therefore
·







2r[((N +1 )q − σ)(ρ + δ + η − k)+θb]
(N +1 )[ 2 rρk − q(σ − (N +1 )q)]
(54)
and the slope of the Nash trajectory in the control plane becomes sensitive
to pollution thanks to the Pigouvian tax rate.
Also in this case, multiple equilibrium points appear. Provided that
the market is large enough, σ>2
p
2(1 + N)rρ(ρ + δ + η), we obtain three
steady states corresponding to no pollution:







;( 5 5 )





σ2 − 8(1 + N)rρ(ρ + δ + η)
2(1 + N)
,ρ+ δ + η
!
;





σ2 − 8(1 + N)rρ(ρ + δ + η)
2(1 + N)
,ρ+ δ + η
!
.
Moreover, as in the social planning case, two further equilibria with positive
23stocks of pollution exist:





(δ + ρ)(σ −
p






σ2 − 8η(1 + N)rρ
,η
!
;( 5 6 )





(δ + ρ)(σ +
p










The steady states (56) and (57) depend on the Pigouvian tax rate: in par-
ticular, notice that qθ
4 >q θ
5 and that the associated steady state levels of
pollution are decreasing in θ.
At this stage, it is worth carrying out a comparative analysis of the social





the i-th steady state values in the present case, the levels of social welfare
SWθ
























σ2 − 8(1 + N)ηrρ)2 − 1
!





































4 >S W θ
5 irrespective of all the parameter values.
Now we compare SWθ
4 with the maximum social welfare level that would
be obtained under social planning case, i.e. SW1 =
σ2
2
, in order to derive the
threshold values of the tax rate that allows to reach SW1 under oligopolistic
competition .
If we consider SWθ
4 as a function of θ ∈ (0,∞), we can stress that it takes






2ηNr[4ηrρ(η + ηN − ρN) − (2ρ − η)σ(σ −
p
σ2 − 8(1 + N)ηrρ)]
(σ −
p
σ2 − 8(1 + N)ηrρ)2 .
(60)
Moreover, SWθ
4 is strictly increasing, consequently admitting a horizon-








.C a l l K :=




, then the optimal tax rate θ
∗ entailing the identity SW1 =
SWθ∗






An analogous procedure can be carried out with SWθ
5, where it can be easily
ascertained that the tax rate θ
∗∗ such that SW1 = SWθ∗∗
5 exceeds θ
∗ and the
inequality with respect to the related externality levels is inverted, i.e. Sθ∗
4 >
Sθ∗∗
5 . In other words, the tax rate that allows to reproduce the social welfare
SW1 is higher and corresponds to a higher level of output and pollution.























5 aﬀects the denominator of the previous relation,
because π4 + CS4 >π 5 + CS5. Hence, the ﬁrst best social welfare can be
obtained by moving along two diﬀerent paths: either with a larger quantity
and a lower price but a higher externality level, or conversely with a smaller
quantity and a higher price but a lower externality.9
The remarkable feature of the latter result is that, starting form a situ-
ation where the command optimum (point PSP1) reproducing the perfectly
competitive outcome is not, in general, attainable under planning except in
the uninteresting case where the productive technology is completely green at
the outset, it is nonetheless true that there exist an optimal stationary indus-
trial policy whereby the regulator can drive proﬁt-maximising ﬁrms to yield
the same steady state welfare level associated with the ﬁrst best, although of
course at the price of a diﬀerent surplus allocation and environmental exter-
nality. If the regulator is interested in the size of the total pie but not in the
relative size of its slices, this is a price that he might well be willing to pay.
6 Concluding remarks
We have revisited the issue of the incentive for ﬁrms to carry out R&D eﬀorts
aimed at introducing environmental-friendly technologies. Contrary to the
acquired view establishing that such an incentive is lacking due to the fact
that ﬁrms fail to internalise the environmental externality, the dynamic ap-
proach we have adopted in the foregoing analysis shows that ﬁrms do have an









− 2η (N +1 )rΥ
2δ(N +1 )
2
where Ω = σ2−8ηρ(N +1 )r and Υ =2 ρ2 (N +1 )N +δ
£
η(N +1 )+2 ρN2¤
. There exist
admissible parameter regions where the above proﬁts are strictly positive.
26R&D incentive in this direction throughout the game, although it may indeed
vanish in one speciﬁc steady state, which portrays the equilibrium outcome
of the corresponding static game. Such an incentive has no altruistic nature,
being associated with a quasi collusive decision on output levels whereby any
environmentally-oriented R&D is accompanied by a price increase.
Moreover, we have investigated the behaviour of the model under the
assumption that a benevolent planner controls production and R&D, showing
that the perfectly competitive outcome with marginal cost pricing and a
totally clean technology is one of the possible steady states of the system, but
is feasible only if initial conditions are such that the environmental externality
is not an issue from the very outset.
Yet, as a (partial) remedy, we have found that there exist a feasible sta-
tionary Pigouvian tax rate able to induce proﬁt-maximising ﬁrms to follow
a path leading to the very same aggregate steady state welfare as in the ﬁrst
best.
The foregoing analysis can be extended in several directions, to examine
feedback solutions, the implications of international trade with transbound-
ary pollution and uncertainty aﬀecting both the accumulation of pollution
and the R&D outcome, all of these issues to be nested into a general equi-
librium approach. These extensions are left for future research.
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